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CLASS ACTIONS IN ILLINOIS: TOWARD A MORE
ATTRACTIVE FORUM FOR THIS ESSENTIAL
REMEDY
Kevin M. Forde*
Presently, there is no statute governing the maintenance of class
actions in Illinois. As a result, there is a movement to codify
present case law and enact provisions where case law is lacking.
In this Article, the author delineates the requirements for bring-
ing a class action as established by Illinois court decisions. The
author believes a codification of class action law is inevitable
and desirable. In conclusion, he proposes a model rule that at-
tempts to establish guidelines for the adjudication of class
actions.
Class actions have been the subject of exhaustive litigation and
debate over the past few years. Although this litigation tool was
judicially recognized and approved in English common law as
early as the seventeenth century,I it was not until the past decade
that its full potential was appreciated. This emergence, particu-
larly in the federal courts, may be attributed to two develop-
ments. First, a whole new era of litigation has developed in sub-
ject areas which are particularly suited to class litigation such as
antitrust,2 securities,3 fraud,' civil rights and equal opportunity
statutes,' pension and wage disputes,' and the whole spectrum of
consumer cases.7 Second, these substantive law developments
* Member of Illinois Bar; J.D., Loyola University (Chicago). Mr. Forde is presently
engaged in private practice and is also Editor-in-Chief of the Chicago Bar Record.
1. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CLAss AcTiONS §1.2 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as IICLE].
2. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333
F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); IICLE, supra note 1, at §8.4.
3. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1968); Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 78 (1969).
Actions under the securities laws represent the largest single group of class action cases
in the federal courts. See IICLE, supra note 1, at §8.3.
4. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971).
5. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974); Wil-
liams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
6. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Beame, 67 F.R.D. 30 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975).
7. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971); Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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arose contemporaneously with the liberalization of the federal
procedural rules governing class actions.'
However, proponents of class litigation have suffered serious
setbacks in the federal courts, particularly as a result of Zahn v.
International Paper Co. ,' requiring, in cases of diversity jurisdic-
tion, that each class member's claim exceed the jurisdictional
minimum of $10,000,10 and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," requir-
8. Class actions are governed by Federal Rule 23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The essential
prerequisites are found in subsection (a) of the rule which provides that a member of a
class may sue or be sued on behalf of the class if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
In addition to the above recited prerequisites, the proposed action must also properly
fall within one of the three categories listed in subsection (b) of Rule 23:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
9. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
10. Id. at 300. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., was a diversity action brought on behalf of 200
lake front property owners in Vermont. The plaintiffs charged that the defendant, Interna-
tional Paper Company of New York, illegally permitted discharges from its paper plant
to flow into a creek which later carried the pollutants into the lake adjoining the plaintiffs'
property, thereby damaging the value and utility of their property. The named class
representatives alleged individual damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount
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ing that notice be given all identifiable class members and that
the party seeking class adjudication initially bear the burden of
this notice.'" Consequently, access to the federal courts has been
curtailed dramatically and a corresponding increase in the vol-
ume of class action litigation in the state courts can be expected.
Unlike the federal practice and the practice in most states,
there is no specific class action statute or rule in Illinois. 3 The
only reference to the subject is found in section 52.1 of the Civil
Practice Act, which provides that:
An action brought on behalf of a class shall not be compromised
or dismissed except with the approval of the court and, unless
excused for good cause shown, upon notice as the court may
direct."
Thus, Illinois class actions have developed solely as a result of
case law.'" While a few cases are difficult to reconcile, a clear
pattern of prerequisites emerges when the facts of the most signif-
icant cases are analyzed. However, this case-by-case develop-
of ten thousand dollars required in diversity cases. However, the unnamed members of
the class could not show damages exceeding this jurisdictional amount. The plaintiffs
contended that the requirement of ten thousand dollars need be met only by the named
representative parties who could then prosecute lesser claims on behalf of the absent class
members.
The Supreme Court held that, under jurisdictional limitations of the federal courts as
established by Congress, each plaintiff and each absent class member must individually
possess a claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum. If the claim of one of the plaintiffs
qualifies while the claim of another plaintiff or an absent class member does not, the non-
qualifying claimant is to be dismissed from the action. Id. at 300.
11. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
12. Id. at 178-79. In Eisen, the plaintiff brought a class action against a number of
brokerage firms alleging conspiracy to charge excessive commissions in the handling of
"odd-lot" securities. The class whom plaintiff purported to represent consisted of approxi-
mately 3,750,000 customers of brokers. Evidence showed that notice of mailing would cost
$400,000. The Eisen court held that individual notice must be given to all identifiable
members of the class and that the cost of this notice initially must be borne by the plaintiff
or person seeking to represent the class.
13. Landesman v. General Motors Corp., 42 Ill.App.3d 363, 356 N.E. 2d 105 (Ist Dist.
1976); Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 lll.App.3d 987, 989-90, 312 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1st Dist.
1974); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
B.U. L. REv. 407, 425-28 (1969).
Class actions in the federal courts are governed by Federal Rule 23. See note 8 supra.
Similarly, some states have adopted rules or legislation governing class actions. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. §1005; CAL. CIv. PRAc. CODE §382.
14. ILL. Civ. PRAc. AcT §52.1.
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
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ment has left considerable discretion with the trial courts to work
out the problems and permit class actions when they feel the case
can proceed in a practical and efficient manner. Furthermore,
when the trial court finds the essential prerequisites present,
these findings will not be disturbed unless a reviewing court de-
termines that they are contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence.' 7
Because of the 'Uncertainty inherent in this case law develop-
ment and the binding effect of the trial court findings, it is
strongly advocated in many quarters that a statute or court rule
be adopted to provide specifically for the maintenance of class
actions in Illinois.'" In view of the force of this movement, the
adoption of some formal rule seems inevitable. This prospect has
caused considerable concern among practicing lawyers who gen-
erally have a well-deserved fear of the efforts of legislators and
rule-makers to "reform," "improve" or "clarify" any reasonably
defined area of law. However well-founded these fears may be, it
is submitted that, drawing on existing case law and the federal
experience with Rule 23, a sound and workable statute or rule can
be adopted which may add certainty and predictability to this
elusive subject without doing violence to the second case law
which has developed in Illinois. The demonstration of this propo-
sition requires discussion of the current state of Illinois law, a
17. Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 784, 798, 305 N.E.2d 236, 247
(1st Dist. 1973), appeal dismissed, 60 Ill.2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975); Ross v. 311 North
Central Ave. Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill.App.2d 336, 346, 264 N.E.2d 406, 412 (lst Dist. 1970).
This view is consistent with federal practice. See, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-
United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 139 (7th Cir. 1974).
18. In the last session of the General Assembly, a bill was introduced by Representative
Arthur Berman which proposed adoption of Federal Rules 23, 23.1 and 23.2 as new para-
graphs 57.2, 57.3 and 57.4 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. Representative Berman can-
didly advised the members of the House that this Bill was merely a convenient starting
point. Additionally, he stated that it was his hope that legislative hearings might be
conducted as to the merits of either maintaining the law in its present form or adopting a
formal statute on the subject. Significantly, there was no enthusiasm for a verbatim
adoption of the federal rule in general and the notice provisions of that rule in particular.
Mr. Berman has since been elected to the Senate and is expected to introduce a similar
Bill in that Chamber during the current session.
The Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee is also in the process of proposing a rule
on class actions. The final proposal by the Committee as submitted to the court is not
yet available for comment, but it is anticipated that the supreme court will invite com-
ments prior to the adoption of the rule. Finally, the Chicago Bar Association's Committee
on the Development of the Law has an active subcommittee considering the need for a
class action rule in Illinois.
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comparison to the federal experience, and a consideration of some
alternatives.
CURRENT PREREQUISITES UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
To maintain a class action suit in an Illinois court the propo-
nent of class litigation must establish that:
1. The potential class consists of a number of members too
numerous to be individually joined in the action.
2. The named parties adequately represent the class.
3. There are common questions of fact or law which are the
dominant and central issues in the case so that the class mem-
bers have a common interest in the subject matter of the suit.
4. The class action is an appropriate method to dispose of the
issues raised in the controversy."5
These prerequisites in many respects parallel those of class
adjudication under Federal Rule 23 (a) and 23 (b)(3). Unlike the
federal rule, however, notice to the entire identifiable class is not
required. Moreover, Illinois state courts do not suffer the jurisdic-
tional limitation relating to the amount in controversy which
applies in federal courts.
The Class is So Numerous that Joinder of AU Members
Individually is Impracticable
The proponent of class adjudication in Illinois must show that,
"[the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation
is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual
rules of procedure is impracticable."20 This requirement is the
simplest to satisfy and seldom is a disputed issue. It is derived
essentially from early equity practice21 and is also found in the
Federal Rules22 as a prerequisite to a class action.
However, the impracticability of joinder is not a simple numer-
ical proposition. It depends upon a number of other considera-
19. Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Newberry
Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Landesman v. General Motors
Corp., 42 Ill.App.3d 363, 356 N.E.2d 105 (1st Dist. 1976); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344
Ill.App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951).
20. Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 103, 67 N.E.2d 265, 273 (1946),
quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Midway Tobacco Co. v. Mahin, __
Ill. App. 3d -, 356 N.E.2d 909 (lst Dist. 1976).
21. See note 1 supra; Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See note 8 supra.
1977]
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tions including the location of claimants, 3 the amount of their
claims, their ability to bring suit on their own behalf, and the
likelihood that they might do So. 24 It is anticipated that in any
case in which there is a substantial number of potential claim-
ants, and the individual amounts of their claims are relatively
small, an Illinois court will exercise its discretion to permit the
case to proceed as a class action.25 Under the federal rule, a class
with only eighteen members has been found to be so numerous
as to make joinder impracticable." On the other hand, under
differing circumstances, proposed classes of sixteen, 2 forty 2 and
even 84021 have been found insufficient in number to meet the
requirement of impracticability of joinder.
This issue rarely is discussed in Illinois cases, generally because
a proponent of class adjudication would not consider bringing a
case where there was not a substantial number of claimants. If a
proposed class consists of only eighteen or forty proposed claim-
ants seeking money damages, it may not be feasible, from an
economic point of view, to bring the action on behalf of the class.
If injunctive relief is the principal, object of the suit, one party can
generally accomplish the desired result without the need for class
adjudication. On the other hand, where there are a small number
of claimants with substantial claims, joinder of all in one case
may not be impracticable. All of these considerations call for a
23. Where the potential class members are all located within the same area, joinder is
less of a problem than where the parties are widely scattered. Compare Bennett v. United
States, 266 F. Supp. 627, 629 (W.D. Okla. 1965), with Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55
F.R.D. 259, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
24. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); Donelan, Prerequisites
to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, The Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. &
CoM.L. REV. 527, 531 (1969); Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View,
32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 298 (1966); Harte & Forde, Practical Problems in Handling Class
Actions, 15 TRIAL L. J. 549, 553 (1971). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §1762 (1972).
25. See Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Smyth
v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill.2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956); Magro v. Continental
Toyota, Inc., 37 Ill.App.3d 1, 344 N.E.2d 675 (1st Dist. 1976); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344
Ill.App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951).
26. See, e.g., Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648
(4th Cir. 1967).
27. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 288 F. Supp. 60, 61 (S.D. Ill.
1968).
29. See, e.g., Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 18 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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balancing of the competing factors in a given case. In practice,
disputes on this subject have been rare if not non-existent.
The Named Parties Must Adequately Represent the Class
Adequate representation is essential to the maintenance of a
class action.30 It is the method by which compliance with due
process requirements is guaranteed. Thus, lack of adequate repre-
sentation is one of the few grounds which will permit a collateral
attack upon a class action judgment.3'
The critical test to determine whether the named parties ade-
quately represent the class has been stated as follows:
[W]hether those sought to be bound as members of the class
are in fact adequately represented by the parties who actually
participate in the conduct of litigation in which members of the
class sought to be bound, are not present as parties . . .3
Essentially, the determination involves a consideration of
whether the representative interests are compatible with, and not
antagonistic to, those of the class and whether the representative
parties will put up a "real fight." 3 Thus, neither the number of
representative parties nor the size of their claims is controlling.3
To establish adequacy of representation, the proponent of class
adjudication first must'show that the claims are common. 5 This
assures that the class representative will adequately assert the
claim of those on whose behalf he seeks to act. The courts have
reasoned that the interests of absent class members will be pro-
tected so long as the representative parties are vigorous advo-
30. Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 90-91, 55 N.E.2d 147, 151 (1944);
Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill.App. 483, 486, 101 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1st Dist. 1951).
31. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Newberry Library v. Board of
Educ., 387 Il. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
32. Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 90-91, 55 N.E.2d 147, 151 (1944);
Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill.App. 483, 486, 101 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1st Dist. 1951).
33. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); State Life Ins. Co. v.
Board of Educ., 394 Ill. 301, 308, 68 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1946).
34. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968) (two of 800 pur-
chasers of securities who acquired 700 of 100,000 shares offered for sale were held to fairly
and adequately represent the class); Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.
App.3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1973) (three borrowers on behalf of thousands).
35. Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 531, 542-43, 236 N.E.2d 698, 705 (1968); Harrison Sheet
Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 537, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1959); Perlman v. First Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 784, 803, 305 N.E.2d 236, 250 (1st Dist. 1973).
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cates for common rights shared with the class.3" In addition to
showing this common interest, the proponent must establish that
he is capable of acting as champion on behalf of the class.3"
Obviously, there is a direct relationship between the adequacy
of representation prerequisite and the separate prerequisite re-
quiring that there be common questions of fact or law in the
litigation. It is the litigation of the common questions which guar-
antees in part that the representation will be adequate. In deter-
mining adequacy of representation, however, it is important to
stress that there need not be a total identity of the claims as
between the representative party and the absent class members,
so long as the named parties share a common interest in estab-
lishing the essential elements sought to be litigated on behalf of
the class. 8 It may well be that absent class members have addi-
tional claims, or are subject to additional defenses. However,
these facts need not defeat the attempt to adjudicate on behalf
of a class. 9 Again, the judicial evaluation of the quality of the
representation rests particularly within the sound discretion of
the trial judge.
There must be Common Questions of Fact or Law which are
Dominant and Pervasive.
Any action contemplated as a class action must present cir-
cumstances giving rise to questions of fact or law common to all
the parties in the alleged class."° Either the claims of all parties
must be based on the common application of a statute or regula-
tion, or all parties and class members must be aggrieved by the
same or similar misconduct.4 In order to adjudicate on behalf of
the class, however, it is not enough for the proponent to show that
36. Id.
37. See Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 Ill.App.3d 987, 991-92, 312 N.E.2d 753, 757 (1st
Dist. 1974).
38. See, e.g., Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill.2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
39. Id.
40. See Hagerty v. General Motors Corp., 59 Ill.2d 52, 319 N.E.2d 5 (1974), appeal
dismissed, 60 1ll.2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 l.2d
532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 784,
305 N.E.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1973). See also Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under
The Federal Rules And In Illinois, 42 ILL. L. Rev. 518 (1947).
41. See Kruse v. Streamwood Util. Corp., 34 Ill.App.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (lst Dist.
1962); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill.App. 488, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951). See also
cases cited in note 40 supra.
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some issues are common to all class members. Rather, the propo-
nent must show that the common issue of fact or law are domi-
nant and pervasive, as opposed to being ancillary to the central
issues in the case.42
This prerequisite is similar to that required under Federal Rule
23 (b)(3). Under 23 (b)(3), before an action may be litigated as a
class action, the proponent must establish that there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over
those affecting only certain individual members.43 Thus, the issue
arises as to what constitutes a dominant and pervasive issue.
The determination of whether the common issues are dominant
and pervasive requires an analysis of all issues presented by the
case, segregating the common questions from those that may af-
fect only certain members of the class." The analysis necessary
for this determination was well expressed by Justice Schaefer in
Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons.'5 In that case, certain custom-
ers of Harrison brought suit to obtain a refund of certain pay-
ments collected from them by Harrison, as payments under the
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act.'6 Previously, Harrison had suc-
cessfully challenged the legality of the tax and obtained a refund
of taxes paid. However, Harrison refused to refund the taxes to
the retail customers who had actually paid the tax. Consequently,
an action was brought on behalf of the hundreds of customers
that dealt with Harrison in separate and isolated transactions
claiming their right to the money retained by Harrison.
Though at times mislabeled a "tax" case, the court character-
ized the action as a restitution action between private individu-
als, presenting the common question of "whether the Company,
which took money from its customers upon the ground that a tax
was due . . . can resist the claim of those customers for
restitution.'"' Having characterized this as a restitution action,
the common questions of fact and law were neatly posed. Thus,
42. See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 1l.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); Harri-
son Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959).
43. See note 8 supra.
44. See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 10 Ill.2d 448, 456, 167 N.E.2d 230, 235
(1960); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1959);
Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill.2d 27, 44, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956); Perlman v.
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill. App.3d 734, 305 N.E.2d 236, 247 (1st Dist. 1973).
45. 15 Ill.2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§440-453 (1975).
47. 15 Ill.2d at 536, 155 N.E.2d at 597.
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the court avoided what it saw as problems of "individual proof"
that would have been necessary had this been an action by the
customers against the state to obtain repayment from the state
under what it viewed as the "rigid" refund provisions of the Retail
Sales Act. 8
The court's apprehension about the problem of individual proof
posed by tax cases was misplaced. In Fiorito v. Jones,4" the court
upheld the litigation of a st4te-wide tax as a class action despite
problems of individual proof. Fiorito involved an action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the 1967 Amendments to the Occupa-
tions Service Act5" and included the claims of 43,000 class mem-
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§440.-453 (1975). Under that Act each claimant must
establish (a) that the claimant bore the burden of the tax, and (b) that he had not been
in any way reimbursed nor shifted such burden directly or indirectly through inclusion of
such amount in the price of personal property sold by him or in any other manner. 15 Ill.2d
at 537, 155 N.E.2d at 598.
The court appears to have been concerned with certain limiting language found in its
earlier opinion in Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995
(1942). In Peoples Store, a merchant sought to recover taxes paid under the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act for sales alleged to be exempt. The case was brought as a class action
on behalf of all other merchants who paid the tax. The court held that the action was not
a proper class action because, while all members of the class had a common interest in
determining whether the sales were exempt from the tax, a favorable decision on that
point would not establish the existence of the right to recovery in every other seller. In
fact, each member would have to establish that he met other individual prerequisites for
recovery under the refund statute, specifically, that he actually bore the burden of the
tax and did not include the tax in his sales price and in no other way passed on the tax.
Id. at 154, 39 N.E.2d at 998. By properly viewing Harrison as a restitution case, the court
was able to avoid contradicting Peoples Store.
The same approach was taken by the appellate court in Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co.,
17 Ill.App.2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1st Dist. 1958), a case very similar to Harrison. In that
case, the defendant was a retailer of carpeting. On its bills it charged its customers a tax
based on the Retailers Occupation Tax Act, although it had obtained a refund for these
taxes on the basis that the taxes were not authorized. Not only did the defendant refuse
to repay the funds to its customers, but it continued to make the same charges on future
sales.
With respect to the class action allegation of the complaint, the court held that a class
action was proper because the same questions of law and fact were involved in every class
member's claim.
The only issue presented to the court is, did the various customers of the defen-
dant pay to it a sum of money separately listed as a tax upon the bills which
had been rendered to them and which defendant is now seeking to retain al-
though the tax had been wrongfully collected?
Id. at 34, 149 N.E.2d at 479. See also Cook v. Cohn, 25 Ill.App.2d 330, 166 N.E.2d 614
(1st Dist. 1960).
49. 39 Ill.2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§439.202-439.121 (1975).
19771 CLASS ACTIONS
bers involved in over 1,000 different retail businesses seeking re-
covery of more than thirty-nine million dollars. Even though all
of these retailers paid the tax, arising from numerous, separate
transactions, the court found that the common and dominant
theme was the constitutionality of the tax. The court made this
finding even though it would be necessary for all class members
to show that they in fact paid the tax, the amount of their pay-
ment, and that they h~d not passed on the tax burden.' Since
Fiorito, courts have routinely permitted cases challenging the
legality of state and local taxes to be litigated on behalf of a class,
despite the existence of individual issues. These cases are almost
classic Illinois class action cases, with the "dominant and perva-
sive issue" being the legality of the tax.5"
Obviously, in many class action suits there will be, in addition
to certain individual claims, certain individual defenses that may
be asserted against some class members. These defenses or claims
may be separate and independent from the common and central
issues. However, this fact is insufficient to defeat the action where
the claims of the class are based on common factual circumstan-
ces, governed by common legal principles.53
51. In limiting the force of the prior Roseland opinion, the court stated:
In cases decided subsequent to Roseland, courts, uniformly applying the basic
criterion of a community of interest in the subject matter of the suit and the
remedy requested, have upheld the use of a class action in a variety of situations
(citations omitted), including taxpayer suits to restrain the enforcement of al-
legedly invalid taxing acts or to recover payments made thereunder ....
Here, as in Harrison, there is a common fund and common factual and legal
issues, the most important being the constitutionality of the 1967 amendments.
Also, in view of this dominant issue, the differences which defendants contend
exist between members of the class with respect to their right and amount of
recovery from the fund are not sufficient to bar the instant action.
39 Ill.2d at 543-44, 236 N.E.2d at 705-06.
52. Dee-El Garage v. Korzen, 53 Ill.2d 1, 289 N.E.2d 431 (1973).
A more recent case was brought on behalf of all owners of cooperative apartment build-
ings in Cook County challenging the classification of these apartment buildings for assess-
ment and real estate tax purposes. The Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Daniel J.
Covelli, held that the action could be maintained as a class action even though once the
common claim was established, i.e., the unconstitutionality of the classification system,
each apartment owner would have to show the market value of his individual unit to
establish the overassessment. The parties established court-approved formulas for ascer-
taining value which disposed of literally hundreds of claims. In the few instances in which
there was a dispute between the parties as to the measure of full value, the court was
required to resolve the issue. Bellmore Apts. v. Cullerton, 73 CH 3697 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty.
1974).
53. As the court stated in Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 538, 155
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The comparative analysis between dominant common issues
and individual issues is often the center of dispute in cases where
liability is based on allegations of fraud. These cases usually in-
volve the contents and nature of a defendant's statements or
conduct or the victim's reliance thereon.54 Numerous federal
courts have held that a class of claimants share an adequate
common question in fraud cases where a common scheme is pres-
ent, even if individual issues such as reliance remain to be liti-
gated.5" Consequently, where a defendant has caused a series of
misrepresentations, all finding different and varied victims, fed-
eral courts have found common questions of fact or law if the
alleged misrepresentations are part of a common scheme or
course of conduct.5" However, in determining whether the com-
mon issues in fraud cases are "dominant and pervasive" the Illi-
nois courts may require a common writing such as a form solicita-
N.E.2d 595, 598 (1959):
[tihe hypothetical existence of individual issues is not a sufficient reason to
deny the right to bring a class action. Where it appears that the common issue
is dominant and pervasive, something more than the assertion of hypothetical
variations of a minor character should be required to bar the action (citations
omitted). The company's opportunity to defend any individual issues that may
arise will not be impaired, and it can hardly be said that it will suffer greater
inconvenience by litigating those issues in a single action instead of in separate
actions.
Id. at 538.
The same reasoning has been applied by the court in cases decided subsequent to
Harrison. See, e.g., cases cited in note 13 supra.
An illustrative factual application of this principle is found in Rosen v. Village of
Downers Grove, 19 Ill.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960). There the Village adopted an ordi-
nance which required as a condition to the approval of a subdivision plan, that the
subdivider pay a fee to the Board of Education. A class action was brought on behalf of
all subdividers required to pay the fee. The defendants contended that because many
subdividers made voluntary payments to the Board of Education, their claims were barred
on the existence of these defenses. The supreme court viewed these defenses as "subsidiary
issues" compared to the central and dominant issues in the case, which were "the validity
of the ordinance and the legality of the procedures adopted by [the Village]." Id. at 456,
167 N.E.2d at 235.
54. See, e.g., Kruse v. Streamwood Util. Corp., 34 Ill.App.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731
(1st Dist. 1962). See also Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), as amended, 49
F.R.D. 286 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Mersay v. First Republic
Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D.
La. 1970).
56. See Mascolo v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973); In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Fischer v. Kletz,
41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
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tion or form contract as opposed to a course of separate and
independent dealings with each class member."7 Thus, a "com-
mon scheme" may be insufficient, unless it is carried out with a
common apparatus.
For example, in Kimbrough v. Parker,5" the court permitted a
class action to proceed on behalf of 3,300 persons who had made
payments to defendants in order to qualify for a contest promis-
ing various premiums and prizes to the winners. Class members
entered the contest by responding to a newspaper advertisement
printed identically in various newspapers throughout the coun-
try. However, the contest was a sham. On appeal, defendants
urged that no class action for fraud was maintainable because the
fraud was personal to each plaintiff and, therefore, the issues were
not sufficiently common. The court rejected that contention, con-
cluding that "[t]he inducements were substantially the same for
all contestants since there were no personal solicitations. '" Sub-
sequently, in Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp.,10 the court
unequivocally rejected the contention that fraud claims are not
suitable to class adjudication.6' Kruse involved fraudulent con-
cealment and misrepresentations in the sale of parcels of real
estate. The defendants sought to limit the reasoning of
Kimbrough to cases where the representations made to the class
members were identical. However, the court refused to limit
Kimbrough, noting that class actions may be upheld where the
defendants are charged with a conspiracy or concerted plan to
defraud the plaintiffs.6 " The court also concluded that since it
could have been inferred from the pleadings that the cause of
action lay in contract rather than based upon fraudulent misre-
presentation, the class action would be upheld. 3
57. See Kruse v. Streamwood Util. Corp., 34 Ill.App.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1st Dist.
1962); Rice v. Snarlin, Inc., 131 Ill.App.2d 434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (1st Dist. 1970). See also
Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). But see Rodriguez v. Credit Systems
Specialists, Inc., 17 Ill.App.3d 606, 308 N.E.2d 342 (1st Dist. 1974) (class action permitted
where there were similar transactions but separate contracts).
58. 344 Ill.App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951).
59. Id. at 486, 101 N.E.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
60. 34 Ill.App.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1st Dist. 1962).
61. Id. at 109, 180 N.E.2d at 734.
62. Id. at 107, 180 N.E.2d at 734, citing Hale v. Allinson, 188 U.S. 56 (1903); Abbott v.
Loving, 303 11. 154, 135 N.E. 442 (1922); City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N.E.
907 (1898); Wilkinson v. Heberling, 231 Ill.App. 516 (3d Dist. 1923).
63. 34 Ill.App.2d at 108, 180 N.E.2d at 735. See also Steinberg v. Chicago Medical
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In Rice v. Snarlin,4 the court was similarly concerned with the
existence of a common prospectus or apparatus. In Rice, the de-
fendants solicited young models to pay a fee for listing in a direc-
tory to be sent to businesses that might need models in their
advertising and promotion. The plaintiffs alleged that the prom-
ised directory was merely an advertising flyer sent to randomly
selected companies that may have no need for the services of a
model. The claimed common question was whether a civil action
for damages could be maintained under the Consumer Fraud
Act." This legal issue was essential to the claims of all the mem-
bers of the class." However, the court held that this issue was not
the dominant issue in the case, because the alleged wrong was the
omission and concealment of material facts that could not be
confined to a form contract submitted to all class members. Since
the personal solicitations might have varied from model to model,
the court held that the individual issues were dominant and thus
the class members did not share a central issue that would permit
class adjudication.
Thus, the court, from Kimbrough to Rice, has tacitly adopted
the rule that a common apparatus or form contract guarantees
that the alleged misconduct is not only common to all class mem-
bers, but is also the dominant and pervasive issue in the case. 7
Where separate and oral dealings are involved, however, the facts
School, 41 Ill.App.3d 804, 354 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1976). See note 62 supra.
64. 131 IIl.App.2d 434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (1st Dist. 1970).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121V, §261 (1975).
66. 131 Ill.App.2d at 440, 266 N.E.2d at 187.
67. The elusive nature of the "dominant and pervasive" issue concept has not been
limited to fraud cases. For example, in Hagerty v. General Motors, 59 Ill.2d 52, 139 N.E.2d
5 (1974), rev'g 14 Ill.App.3d 33, 302 N.E.2d 678 (1st Dist. 1973), the plaintiff brought her
automobile to a Cadillac agency for repairs. After the repairs were completed, she paid a
bill charging her $30.05 for labor and $16.26 for materials. Included in the bill was an
additional 4% based upon the retail value of the item sold. In an action sought to be
prosecuted as a class action, the plaintiff contended that this was not an appropriate
transaction for sales tax, which is computed on the basis of the retail value of the item
sold. Rather, she argued that the auto dealer should have charged the tax determined
under the Serviceman's Act, which is computed on the basis of the value of the personal
property at the cost to the serviceman. The difference at issue was thirty-three cents.
Thus, in order to determine the proper charge in an individual case, each transaction
would have to be analyzed to determine whether the "service" or "sale" was the predomi-
nant aspect of the transaction. Consequently, the court held that since each transaction
had to be analyzed there was no longer a common dominant and pervasive issue in the
case and the case could not proceed as a class action.
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must be more closely scrutinized to ensure that the individual
issues are not the dominant issues in the case.
A Class Action is the Most Appropriate Method to Dispose
of the Issues Raised in the Controversy
This prerequisite is stated in the federal rules under sub-
paragraph (b)(3), which requires the court to find that a class
action is superior to other available methods of adjudication. "
Although this consideration is not discussed in Illinois cases, the
author believes that it is implicit in state court decisions.", Under
this prerequisite, the court determines whether a class action in
a particular case can best secure the economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision or accomplish
other ends of equity and justice sought to be attained in these
actions.' The court also will consider alternatives to class litiga-
tion, such as intervention and joinder, in determining whether
the action should proceed as a class action.
A controlling factor is that, in many cases, the class action is
the only practical means for class members to receive redress.7'
Other factors considered are the difficulties that may be encoun-
tered in maintaining a class action" and the desirability of con-
centrating litigation in a single forum."
GENERAL MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES
Several cases and journals suggest that certain prerequisites
may be essential to class adjudication. The most common mis-
68. See note 8 supra.
69. In Perlman the trial court made the explicit finding that: "A class action is superior
to a multiplicity of individual actions for the fair and efficient adjudication of this contro-
versy." 70 CH 3653 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1972).
70. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcrICE 23.45 (2d ed. 1969); 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1779, at 60-61 (1972).
71. See Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Kim-
brough v. Parker, 344 Ill.App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951); Perlman v. First Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1973). See also Werfel v.
Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. N.Y. 1974); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F.Supp. 1154
(S.D. N.Y. 1974).
72. See note 8 supra.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Ill.App.3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (3d Dist.
1972); Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill.App.2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1968); see
Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Il. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942). See also
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conception is that a common fund is required before an action
may proceed as a class action.75 The need for a common fund was
discussed in Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago." In
Perlman, the bank argued that in order to maintain a class action
there must be "a sequestered fund of money easily identified and
computed."" The court acknowledged that certain cases had dis-
cussed the presence or absence of a common fund as a basis for
denying class action relief," but rejected this contention, noting
that it found no precedential basis for such a conclusion."
The existence of a common fund is an important consideration
to the extent that an existing common fund, in and of itself, will
generally establish the right to proceed as a class action, due to
the fact that all class members will have an interest in any litiga-
tion which affects their common fund. However, the absence of a
"common fund" in a traditional sense is an attempt to defeat a
class action and where the other prerequisites are all clearly pres-
ent.
Another common misconception is that only courts of equity
have jurisdiction to litigate class actions. 0 This suggestion follows
from the history of the class action, as being a product of the court
of chancery." In addition, the purpose of any class action is to
eliminate a multiplicity of law suits. By this fact alone, an action
brought on behalf of a class is equitable in nature in that its
entertainment by the court will eliminate multiple suits."2 How-
Tornquist, Road Map to Illinois Class Actions, 5 Loy. (CI.) L.J. 45 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Tornquistl; Comment, Class Actions in Illinois: A Viable Alternative to Federal
Rule 23, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & Pao. 113 (1974).
75. A common fund is generally defined as a segregated or sequestered and identifiable
sum of money held by the defendant and properly belonging to the plaintiffs and the class.
See Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 798-802, 305 N.E.2d 247-50 (1st
Dist. 1973).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 798, 305 N.E.2d at 247.
78. See, e.g., Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
79. 15 Ill.App.3d at 800, 305 N.E.2d at 249.
80. See DePhillips v. Mortgage Assocs., Inc., 8 Ill.App.3d 759, 291 N.E.2d 329 (1st Dist.
1972); Fox, Representative Actions and Proceedings, 1954 U. ILL. L. FORUM 94, 97-98
[hereinafter cited as Fox].
81. For a discussion on the historical development of class actions see UCLE, supra note
1, at §§1.1-1.6. See also Fox, supra note 80.
82. Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 I1. 94, 103, 67 N.E.2d 265, 273 (1946),
quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see Boner v. Drazek, 55 Ill.2d 279, 302
N.E.2d 280 (1973); Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill.2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
See also Wilkinson v. Heberling, 231 Ill.App. 516 (3d Dist. 1923).
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ever, with the elimination of most distinctions between law and
chancery under the Illinois Constitution, 3 there is presently little
basis for any distinction in class action jurisdiction.
Finally, the suggestion is sometimes made that an Illinois court
does not have jurisdiction over non-resident absent class mem-
bers and cannot, therefore, enter a decree that is binding on these
persons." This proposition is repudiated by the entire history of
litigation under Federal Rule 23. The court acquires in personam
jurisdiction over member of the class by virtue of its jurisdiction
over the person of the representative parties." In fact, this is the
very concept of class or representative litigation. If a case is pro-
perly brought as a class or representative action, absent class
members need not personally intervene, be served with process,
or in any way appear in the action. If a representative party,
appearing on behalf of the class members, is properly before the
court, all class members are bound by a judgment properly en-
tered and other states will give full faith and credit to that judg-
ment."
Nationwide classes have been upheld repeatedly when the
forum district court would have no power over the residents living
beyond its state." The suggestion that the court in a class action
cannot entertain jurisdiction over absent class members who for-
tuitously reside beyond the jurisdiction of the court overlooks this
representative nature of the class action.
A PROPOSED RULE FOR ILLINOIS
Despite the adequacy of the present case law, a codification of
class action law is desirable. This need is due in part to the pro-
liferation of class actions in recent years and the anticipated in-
crease resulting from limitations imposed on federal class actions
by the federal courts. Furthermore, a rule would also eliminate
83. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§7, 9 (1970). See also INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1969).
84. See Tornquist, supra note 74.
85. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 139-40 (7th
Cir. 1974).
86, See Larson v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 373 Ill. 614, 27 N.E.2d 458 (1940).
87. See, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1951);
Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., [19701 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 12,50 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Cty. 1970).
88. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
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any misconceptions regarding the requirements for maintaining
a class action and the uncertainty inherent in any legal question
that is based solely upon case law.
The author submits that any codification should be based upon
the principles that have evolved from our state court decisions.
Where variances or additions are deemed necessary, we should
refer to the experience of the federal courts. Consequently, the
court and counsel will have the benefit of volumes of decisions,
interpreting and applying these provisions. However, the federal
rule with respect to notice 9 should not be adopted. Rather, the
Illinois statute, providing that an action may not be compromised
or dismissed without notice,90 should be expanded to authorize
the trial court to require notice to the class at any time and under
any circumstances where the court determines that notice is nec-
essary in order to properly protect the interests of the class or the
parties.
Class Actions
Sec. 1. Prerequisites for the Maintenance of a Class Action
(a) An action may be maintained as a class action in any
court of this state and a party may sue or be sued as a repre-
sentative party of the class only if the court finds:
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class,
which common questions predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.
(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Federal Rule 23(c)(2) provides in relevant part:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3) the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
90. ILL. Civ. PRAc. AcT §52.1.
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Comment: Section 1 of the Act provides first that an action
may be maintained as a class action in any court of this state.
This reference is intended to eliminate the misconception that a
class action may be maintained only in the courts of equity." Also
implicit in this term is that a court entertaining a class action
may enter declaratory, injunctive or monetary relief.
The reference in that same section to the fact that a party may
sue or be sued makes it clear that a representative party may be
named as a defendant and be required to defend as and on behalf
of a defendant class. In this respect, the rule is identical to the
federal rule and is consistent with present Illinois practice. How-
ever, the distinction between a defendant class and a plaintiff
class requires special consideration. With respect to a plaintiff
class, the class sought to be certified generally seeks to recover
money damages or other relief on behalf of the absent class mem-
bers. In many of these cases the individual relief sought is small
and in all probability would not be pursued at all, but for the
class action. Where there is a defendant class, the aim of the
parties is to impose liability upon the absent class members.
Because of this distinction, courts have been much stricter in
applying the prerequisites, particularly with respect to the ade-
quacy of the representation by the named party." The circum-
stances where a defendant will be permitted to defend an action
as a representative party on behalf of the defendant class will be
rare. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances when such repre-
sentation does meet with the ends of justice. For this reason, a
provision is made for this possibility.
The first prerequisite is identical with the federal rule and pres-
ent Illinois law. The use of the precise language found in the
federal rule will permit the courts to look to the federal decisions
for guidance on this issue.
The second prerequisite, that there be questions of law com-
mon to the class which predominate over any individual ques-
tions, adopts almost verbatim the language of Federal Rule 23
(b)(3). The adoption of this language from the federal rule is a
departure from the language utilized by Illinois courts requiring
that there be common questions of fact or law which are
91. See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
92. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 Ill.App.3d 987, 312 N.E.2d 753 (1st Dist. 1974).
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"dominant and pervasive" or that there be a "community of in-
terest in the subject matter and the remedy." 3 In departing from
the language of the Illinois cases, it is not suggested that a differ-
ent standard be adopted. As noted previously, in comparing the
federal rule with the Illinois cases, the bottom line is basically the
same.' However, the terms used in the Illinois cases have been
the single most difficult area the courts have encountered in their
attempts to apply Illinois law. The federal rule may prove to be
less elusive in concept and application.
The third prerequisite, that the representative parties fairly
and adequately represent the class, is identical to the federal rule
and current practice in Illinois." The fourth prerequisite, that the
class action be the most appropriate method of adjudicating the
controversy, is currently the law of Illinois" and must be in-
cluded, explicitly or implicitly, under any rule or procedure which
vests such substantial discretion with the court. The same basic
provision is found in subparagraph (b)(3) of the federal rule ex-
cept that under that rule the court must find that the class action
is "superior to other available methods" for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 7 The proposed rule gives the trial
court more discretion in determining whether to permit the class
action to proceed.
Readers conversant with the federal rules may note that the
federal rule prerequisite that "the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class" has not been included. This has intentionally been omit-
ted because the federal cases interpreting the federal rule have
found this prerequisite to be included in the other prerequisites
requiring "common questions" and "adequate representation." 9
93. See, e.g., Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill.2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598
(1959) (dominant and pervasive); Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 l.2d 27, 44, 136
N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956) (community of interest in the subject matter and the remedy).
94. See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
96. See note 69 supra.
97. See note 8 supra.
98. Id.
99. See Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 15 Ill.App.3d 784, 798, 305 N.E.2d 236,
247 (1st Dist. 1973).
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Section 2. Order and Findings Relative to the Class.
(a) Determination of Class. As soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the
court shall determine by order whether it may be so main-
tained and describe those whom the court finds to be members
of the class. This order may be conditional and may be
amended before a decision on the merits.
(b) Class Action on Limited Issues and Sub-classes. When
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or divided into
sub-classes and each sub-class treated as a class. The provi-
sions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accord-
ingly.
(c) Appeals. Any order of court either granting or denying
class adjudication in a given case may be appealed as a mat-
ter of right, within 30 days of said order, or upon a judgment
on the merits.
Comment: Section 2 requires that the class action question be
resolved promptly, "as soon as practicable after the commence-
ment of the action." This is identical to the federal rule and puts
the burden on the party seeking to bring the action on behalf of
a class to bring the matter before the court for such a
determination. There is no present provision under Illinois law
and in some respects this is one of the deficiencies in the Illinois
practice. Under current Illinois law, a case may pend indefinitely,
or even be tried on the merits, without a determination as to
whether the case is properly brought as a class action.
Section 2(a) provides that a class action order may be "condi-
tional and may be amended before a decision on the merits." This
language is identical to that found in the federal rule and is
consistent with state practice. It merely gives the trial court the
discretion to condition or amend its order as facts and circum-
stances may dictate. Section 2(b) authorizes the court to limit
litigation of class actions to particular issues in the case or to
divide the class into sub-classes. Again the language is identical
to that found in the federal rule and state court judges are un-
doubtedly vested with the same inherent discretion under current
law. Section 2(c) authorizes the appeal of any order either grant-
ing or denying class adjudication. There is no similar provision
in the federal rules, and, as explained below, the absence of such
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a provision has been one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the
federal experience.
As a general proposition, an order by the trial court granting
or denying class action status is not a final and appealable order
since it does not determine the final disposition of all claims of
all parties to the lawsuit.1°0 If class certification is denied, the
class proponent must either suffer the dismissal of his case or
prosecute an inconsequential individual claim. If class certifica-
tion is granted, the party opposing the class has no choice but to
proceed with the defense of the action.
Pending the argument of the ultimate appeal on the class ac-
tion questions, the parties do not know whether they are litigating
an individual claim for a relatively few dollars or the claims on
behalf of a large class which may involve millions of dollars.
Because of the obvious desirability of resolving the class action
question before the case is litigated on the merits, various theories
have developed permitting appeal. 10' But there has been no uni-
formity in the application of these principles by the courts.02
Generally, orders approving class litigation have been held not
appealable. 03 Appeals have been permitted from orders denying
class adjudication under various theories. Under certain
circumstances, courts have permitted appeal on the theory that,
for practical purposes, the denial of the class motion terminates
or sounds the "death knell" for the plaintiff's case.' 0' In other
cases, appeal is permitted under the "collateral order doctrine."
This doctrine permits appeal from an order "which finally deter-
mines claims of rights separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consider-
ation be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."''05 In cases
involving injunctive relief, some courts have interpreted the de-
nial of class action status as an order denying injunctive relief
appealable by statute.'"1
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); IICLE, supra note 1, at §§5.11, 5.15.
101. See Anshul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., __ F.2d - (7th Cir. 1976); IICLE, supra
note 1, at §§5.11-5.15; 7A WRIGtrr & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1802.
102. See note 101 supra.
103. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Power Div. Assoc., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1976).
104. Id.
105. Id. See also Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
106. 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) (1971); IICLE, supra note 1, at §5.14.
[Vol. 26:211
CLASS ACTIONS
Other courts have permitted appeal where the issue is certified
for appeal by the trial court. However, the success of any of these
methods of appeal is uncertain. A most convincing argument in
support of permitting appeals in all cases has been made by
Judges Luther M. Swygert and William J. Bauer of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in their dissenting opinion in Anshul v.
Sitmar Cruises, Inc.:'"7
The spirit as well as the purpose of the rule would be better
served by such interlocutory review. That spirit and purpose
should not be frustrated by an unarticulated and perhaps sub-
conscious hope on the part of appellate judges that if review of
important class action determinations are delayed until the
merits of the suit have been decided, the question of such class
determination may be mooted and difficult questions avoided.
The rights involved in the certification of a class action are
simply too important to be left to chance.10
Any codification of a class action procedure in Illinois should
include such a provision authorizing immediate appeal. Under
the proposed rule, a party aggrieved by a class action determina-
tion order does not waive his right to appeal the issue by failing
to seek interlocutory review. Rather, he has the alternative of
waiting for a decision on the merits.
Section 3. Notice.
Upon a determination that an action may be maintained as
a class action, or at any time during the conduct of the action,
the court in its discretion may order such notice that it deems
necessary to protect the interests of the class and the parties.
An order entered under section 2(a) above, determining that
an action may be maintained as a class action, may be condi-
tioned upon the giving of such notice as the court deems ap-
propriate and this condition, and the reasonableness thereof,
is appealable in the same manner as the class determination
order under section 2(c) above.
Comment: One of the most serious drawbacks of the federal
rule is the requirement that, in all actions brought under subpar-
agraph (b)(3), personal notice must be sent to each and every
107. 544 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 1373.
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reasonably identifiable member of the class. 09 Moreover, the
party who represents the class must bear the initial cost of that
notice. Generally, it is presumed that the cost of this notice ul-
timately will be taxed as other costs in the case and borne by the
losing party."10 Still, the initial outlay of these costs makes the
maintenance of a class action a practical impossibility. Consider-
ing the small claims involved, it is obvious that leading Illinois
cases such as Harrison and Kimbrough would never have been
initiated if notice to every conceivable class member had been
required. In this regard, Rule 23(c)(2) as interpreted by the cur-
rent Supreme Court, sounds the deal knell for federal class ac-
tions brought to recover small claims.
The proposed rule set forth above, while recognizing that there
are circumstances where notice may be appropriate, does not
arbitrarily compel notice in every case. Where the claims are
relatively substantial, the class reasonably identifiable and not
exceptionally large or where other considerations call for notice,
the trial court in its discretion may order that notice of the pen-
dency of the action be given to the members of the class. Simi-
larly, the nature, extent and contents of such notice are left
largely within the discretion of the court.
This proposal is essentially consistent with present Illinois
law."' At present there is no notice requirement. The only refer-
ence to notice in class actions is found in Section 52.1 of the Civil
Practice Act"2 which provides for notice to the class, except if
excused for good cause, before any action shall be compromised
or dismissed. In all other instances, and even though all members
of the class are bound by the court's decree,"' individual notice
to the absent class members is not required. To insure due pro-
cess, the courts look to the adequacy of the representation of
absent class members by the representative parties."' This repre-
109. See note 8 supra.
110. Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 42 (S.D. La. 1972); Cole v.
Schenley Industries, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 81, 86-87 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
111. See cases cited in note 114 infra..
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §52.1 (1975); see text accompanying note 14 supra.
113. Fisher v. Capesios, 369 I1. 598, 17 N.E.2d 563 (1938); South East Nat'l Bank v.
Board of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92, 18 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist. 1938); Schmidt v. Modern
Woodmen of America, 261 II. App. 276 (4th Dist. 1931).
114. Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 I1. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1949); State Life
Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., 384 I1. 301, 68 N.E.2d 525 (1946).
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sentation is further guaranteed when the court is satisfied that
the representative parties and all the class members share a com-
munity of interest in the subject matter of the litigation and in
the remedy proposed.
The distinctions between the notice requirements of the federal
rules and Illinois state practice were recently discussed by the
Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Wilcox v. Equity Funding
Life Insurance Co."' Although the issue regarding notice was not
resolved upon appeal," ' the court noted that Eisen was decided
under Federal Rule 23 (c)(2).1" Thus, the court stated that
"[nleither §52.1 of the Civil Practice Act nor the requirements
of due process as suggested in Eisen, require individual notice to
all members of the class in all circumstances.""' 8
A review of prior cases supports the conclusion of the court. The
test of due process in Illinois always has been whether the inter-
ests of absent parties have been adequately protected by the rep-
resentative party. As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Newberry Library v. Board of Education:"'
[Tihe test is whether those sought to be bound as members of
a class are in fact adequately represented by the parties who
actually participate in the conduct of litigation in which mem-
bers of the class sought to be bound, are not present as parties
...or where the interest of the members of the class, some of
whom are present as parties, is joint, or where for any reason the
relationship between the parties present and those absent is
such as legally to entitle the former to stand in judgment for the
latter. 120
The Illinois approach obviously makes sense. Representation
by a vigorous advocate urging the cause of an identically situated
party is greater insurance of due process than an expensive ad in
the Wall Street Journal, which seldom is read by those with small
claims on whose behalf most class actions are brought.'
115. 61 111.2d 303, 335 N.E.2d 448 (1975).
116. The Illinois court held that the sufficiency of the notice was not properly raised in
the trial court and therefore could not be raised on appeal.
117. 61 I1.2d 303, 311, 335 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1975).
118. Id. at 312, 335 N.E.2d at 454.
119. 387 I1. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
120. Id. at 90-91, 55 N.E.2d at 151 (citations omitted). See also State Life Ins. Co. v.
Board of Educ., 394 Ill. 301, 68 N.E.2d 525 (1946).
121. Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules requires that the court give the class "the best
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Section 4. Intervention by and Exclusion of Class Members.
(a) Intervention. Any class member seeking to intervene
or otherwise appear in the action may do so with leave of
court and said leave shall be liberally granted except when
the court finds that said intervention will disrupt the conduct
of the action or otherwise prejudice the rights of the parties
or the class.
(b) Exclusion. Any class member seeking to be excluded
from a class action may request such exclusion and any judg-
ment entered in the action shall not apply to persons who
properly request to be excluded.
Comment: Section 4 first provides that absent class members
may intervene in a class action when their rights are to be liti-
gated. This is consistent with current practice in both the federal
and state courts.' Section 4 also provides that any member of
the class may be excluded from the class if he does not want his
rights adjudicated in the representative action. Consequently, he
will not be bound by the judgment and will not be prevented from
bringing his own action. This, too, is currently the federal law, 3
and is also a part of the judicially evolved law of Illinois.2 '
The "exclusion" provision also raises a problem with respect to
notice. Proponents of a broad use of notice will contend that the
right to exclusion is a hollow right unless a very thorough and
individual notice provision is adopted. They reason that a class
member cannot request to be excluded from a class action unless
notice practicable under the circumstances" in any actions brought under subparagraph
(b)(3) of Rule 23. Often notice by publication is ordered either as a supplement to the
individual notice sent to members who have been identified or as a primary form of notice.
However, one federal court has warned that "ritualistic small print [in] a newspaper
would in no event suffice." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelyn, 391 F.2d 555, 569 (2d Cir. 1968).
See discussion in Herbst v. Able, 49 F.R.D. 286, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Berland v. Mack,
48 F.R.D. 121, 130 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3). See, e.g., Rosen v. Bergman, 40 F.R.D. 19 (S.D. N.Y.
1966); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.1 (1975).
123. See Rule 23(c)(2) and (3) which provides that, in any action brought under
subparagraph (b)(3) of the Federal Rule, class members may request exclusion from the
class. Then, they will not be bound by any judgment entered in the case. In actions
brought under subparagraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), there is no right to request exclusion.
Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
However, as noted above, the great bulk of commercial cases are included in the (b)(3)
category.
124. Ross v. City of Geneva, 357 N.E.2d 829, 835 (1976) (right to opt out inherent in
Illinois law); see cases cited in note 113 supra.
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he has been given notice that it is pending. However, this ques-
tion relates back to the sound discretion of the court in determin-
ing what notice is appropriate in a given case. Where the pro-
posed class of claimants is large and their claims relatively small,
these class members do not have a substantial interest in request-
ing exclusion from the class. As a practical matter, they have
nothing to lose in the litigation. Moreover, the possibility of a
strict notice requirement eliminates the action in its entirety. But
under the proposed rule, where the claims are substantial or
where a defendant class is proposed, a court may consider the
significance of the right to request exclusion, and require appro-
priate notice.
Section 5. Judgment.
Any judgment entered in a class action brought under this
rule shall be binding on all class members, as the class is
defined by the court, except those who have been properly
excluded from the class under section 4(b) above.
Comment: The most essential portion of any class action rule
is the determination as to who will be bound by a judgment
entered in the action. The early cases generally agree that any
decree entered in a class action is binding on all members of the
class as if they were before the court.'25 The Illinois courts have
consistently followed this principle. 2 ' However, the federal courts
deviated from this established procedure for a score of years with
the adoption of the 1938 version of Rule 23.127 The application of
this rule, which remained in effect until the adoption of the pres-
ent rule in 1966, resulted in the categorization of class actions as
"true," "hybrid" and "spurious" and the results in any given case
were dependent upon the categorization by the court. 2 '
125. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853).
126. See Fisher v. Capesios, 369 I1. 598, 604-05, 17 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1938). See also
South East Nat'l Bank v. Board of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92, 18 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist. 1938);
Schmidt v. Modem Woodmen of America, 261 Ill. App. 276 (4th Dist. 1931).
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938).
128. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1752, at 512 (1972), in
which the authors point out that the application of the rule was so uncertain that exam-
ples could be cited where two or more courts, or the same court at different times, applied
different labels to the same case.
The "true" category is generally defined as involving a joint, common or secondary
right. The "hybrid" category involves "several" rights relating to specific property, and
the "spurious" category involves several rights affected by a common question and related
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In a "spurious" action, which is the category most resembling
suits brought under present Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members
were not bound, and could claim no benefit, from a favorable
judgment unless they took some positive act to participate in the
action prior to a decision on the merits. In other words, these
absent class members were required to intervene and become
parties to the action if they were to be affected by a judgment.
Thus, though designated a class action, the spurious action was
not a class or representative action at all as it did not adjudicate
the rights or liabilities of absent parties."' This factor was one of
the most unsatisfactory aspects of the prior rule. Obviously class
members, particularly small claimants, were reluctant to join in
litigation. The expense of counsel alone would often exceed their
claim.
This aspect of federal practice was changed, under the modem
Rule 23. Under subparagraph (b)(3) of that Rule all members of
the class, as defined by the court, are bound by any judgment in
the action unless they take positive steps to be excluded. The
Illinois courts never accepted the concept of a "spurious" action,
but consistently held that in any representative suit, members of
the class are bound by any final judgment therein. 3 '
The proposed rule set forth above retains the binding effect as
to all class members whether they intervene or not. This proposal
avoids the mistake made by the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules
which established the "spurious" class requiring intervention.
It seems imperative at this point to warn that there have been
some attempts to bring the "intervention" concept back into the
federal rules by requiring absent class members to "opt-in" to the
action if they propose to claim its benefits.' ! Thus, a class propo-
nent would be required to give notice to all absent members and
absentees would not be bound by or benefit from the action,
to common relief. The most important distinction between the categories is that while the
judgments in true and hybrid class actions extend to and bind the class, the judgment in
a spurious class action extends only to parties and actual intervenors. See Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules; Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937).
129. See Notes of Advisory Committee, supra note 128. See also Simon, Class Actions
Under Amended Rule 23, 111 ANTITRuST BULLETIN 187 (1966); 7A WmRGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1789 (1972).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1789,
at 175-76; UCLE, supra note 1, at §2.7.
131. See IICLE, supra note 1, at §5.19.
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unless they took some affirmative step to participate, prior to an
adjudication on the merits. This "intervention" procedure would
emasculate all class actions where the individual claims are small
because these claimants are generally unsophisticated in legal
matters and will be reluctant to participate in litigation. How-
ever, these same persons would enthusiastically file a claim if a
successful judgment was obtained on their behalf.
This issue was recently taken up by a distinguished committee
on the New York City Bar Association in connection with a study
of the federal rule. The Committee concluded that a general re-
quirement that absent class members "opt-in" or file proofs of
claim prior to settlement or judgment would adversely curtail the
impact of class actions without corresponding benefit.'32 The
"opt-in" or "intervention" rule should not be adopted in Illinois.
In the interests of all parties, a judgment should bind all class
members as the class is defined in a given case, except those who
have requested to be excluded from the case.
Section 6. Dismissal or Compromise.
Any action brought as a class action under this rule shall
not be compromised or dismissed except with the approval of
the court and, unless excused for good cause shown, upon
notice as the court may direct.
Comment: This provision is the same as section 52.1 33 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act and is very similar to the federal rule. 13
The purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of non-party
class members from unfair or inequitable settlements which will
affect their rights. 135 As guardian of the interests of the class, the
court must evaluate the merits of the settlement and consider
whether notice should be first sent to absent class members be-
fore a compromise is approved or the case is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The current law of Illinois, built firmly on more than a century
of case law, and resting principally upon the sound discretion of
132. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING STOCKHOLDERS SUITS
AND CLASS ACTIONS 435, 445 (1975).
133. ILL. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 52.1.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
135. See UCLE, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
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the trial court, has worked well to vindicate the rights of a class
when their claims are based on common ground. Because of this
overall favorable experience, a convincing argument could be
made against any form of codification. Nevertheless, in the opin-
ion of this author, a codification, by statute or Supreme Court
Rule, would eliminate some of the uncertainties, particularly
with respect to the ancillary issues that presently arise in class
litigation. Questions such as where a case may be filed, what
types of actions are susceptible to class litigation, and whether an
appeal can be taken from class action certification rulings, are
questions that can be resolved by the adoption of a formal statute
or rule.
The proposed rule submitted with this Article draws on the
author's research and experience in both the federal and state
courts. Further suggestions will undoubtedly be made in legisla-
tive proceedings or in the court's consideration of the subject
matter.
It is universally recognized that the concept of class action is
an essential tool for litigating the rights of small claimants lest
the doors of justice be closed to all such claims. The adoption of
a statute or court rule will enable the Illinois state courts to be a
more attractive forum for this essential remedy.
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